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[47 C.2d 
based upon the ground 
of the evidence" was a matter for the 
trial court to determine in the exercise of a ''broad discre-
tion" and there to have been "no abuse" thereof. 
(Keeler supra, p. 137.) [2b] Since the question of 
the the as a party to 
this action \Yas not discussed in the it mani-
cannot affect the determination of that essential issue 
here. \V e therefore conclude that when thereafter 
refused to amend his so as to join the corporation 
as a party, the action could not continue on its behalf and the 
trial court had no alternative but to order its dismissaL 
(Beyerbach v. Juno Oil s?.tpra, 42 Cal.2d 28.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, Schauer, J., 
and McComb, concurred. 
F. No. 19671. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1957.] 
CITY OF W~<\.LNU'r Petitioner, v. EDWARD J. 
SILVEIRA, as City Treasurer, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Public Securities-Issuance-Mandamus.-Mandamus is an ap-
propriate remedy to compel a treasurer to sign bonds 
authorized to be issued pursuant to the Limited Obligation 
Bond Law of 1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 1847; Gov. Code, 43648-
43702) if the proposed issue meets the requirements of the 
law, since the acts demanded are ministerial duties. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Legislative Control- Classification: 
Municipal Affairs.-There must be a reasonable basis for popu-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Securities. § 11; Am.Jur., Mandamus, 
§ 468 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 87 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Municipal Corporations, § 76 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: Public Securities, ~ 12: [2] Munici-
pal Corporations, §§ 83, 88; [3] Constitutional Law, §§ 150, 157; 
[4] Constitutional Law,§ 149; [5, 14, 18] Municipal Corpora-
tions, § 187; [6] Constitutional Law, ~ 150: [7, 9] Constitutional 
Law,§ 156; [8] Constitutional § 163; [10] Constitutional Law, 
§ 60; [11] Evidence, § 18: Municipal Corporations, § 86; [13] 
Municipal Corporations, § 86(3); [16, 17] Municipal Corporations, 
§ 174. 
a municipal affair. 




a reason which 
lature in order that 
to the of the but 
founded 
in legislation. 
[4] not be arbitrary for 
the mere purpose of or in order that legislation 
really local or special may seem to be but must be 
for the purpose of meeting different conditions naturally re-
quiring different legislation. 
[5a, 5b] Municipal Corporations- Fiscal Matters- Bonds.-The 
intended classification the Limited Obligation Bond Law of 
1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 1847; Gov. §§ 43648-43702) of a 
small city with a large surrounding urban population so as to 
permit such city to finance through sales and use taxes local 
improvements to accommodate the influx of people from the 
surrounding unincorporated area is not unreasonable, since 
it would be inequitable for city residents and taxpayers alone 
to bear the burden of financing the improvements. 
[6] Constitutional Law-Classification- Legislative Discretion.-
Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making a classi-
fication, and the Legislature's decision as to what is a sufficient 
distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown 
by the courts unless it is arbitrary and beyond reason-
able doubt erroneous. 
[7] Id.-Classification-Reasonableness.-A distinction in legis-
tion is not arbitrary if any set of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain it. 
[8] Id.-Cla.ssification-Presumptions.-Where the Lfgislature has 
made a classification, the ('Xistence of facts supporting the 
legislative judgment is to be presumed, and the burden of 
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality is cast on the 
assailant. 
[9] Id.-Classification-Reasonableness.-A legislative classifica-
tion is reasonable if it has a substantial relation to a legiti-
mate object to be accomplished. 
[10] !d.-Constitutionality of Statutes- Wisdom.-Whether the 
Legislature has adopted the wisest and most suitable means of 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 272 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Constitutional Law, § 476 et seq. 
circulation in the commercial area, fall the definition of 
" as those words are used in the Constitu-
tion. 
Matters-Bonds.-The Limited Obligation Bond 
ch. 1847; Gov. Code,§§ 43648-43702), 
urban popu-
reauire,mo:nt that the legislation relate to a 
declaring 
interest. 
[16] Payable Out of Special 
a constitutional provision such as Const., art. 
the amount of indebtedness which a city or 
uoJLlLlmu subdivision or agency may incur, is not violated 
by revenue bonds or other obligations which are payable solely 
from a special fund, provided the governmental body is not 
liable to maintain the special fund out of its general funds, or 









Richard IVL ~•wu··~···.r 
for Respondent. 





CARTER, J.-By this mandamus the peti-
tioner, city of Walnut the treasurer 
to issue certain bonds. The bonds were authorized to be issued 
pursuant to the Limited 
1955, ch. 1847; Gov. ~Iandamns 
is an appropriate 
sign the bonds if the 
of the law since the acts demanded 
(City of Oxnard v. Dale, 
The act here involved is 
population of 4,000 or less, which 
one-seventh of the total of the 
incorporated urban area within a radius of miles of its 
limits. Section 6 of article XI of the state Constitution pro-
vides that "Corporations for purposes shall not be 
created by special laws; but the 
laws, provide for the 
fication, in proportion 
which laws may be 
1It has been 
according to 
organization classification, 
the general laws required "by the 
classified" (Rauer Y. Williams, 118 
808 C.2d 
here is whether the act here in-
ing or invalid 
The city of vValnut Creek lS a "general law city" (Gov. 
version of the Classification 
Bill was repealed in 1955 
Code, § . The 1949 
Act and 
(Stats. p. and the established 
"chartered cities" and " 
§ 34100 et Pursuant to 
Law, the of Walnut after notice duly and a 
hearing, determined that the formula was met and 
adopted a resolution in accordance with its findings (Gov. 
Code, § § 2 43649). meeting, 
the city by a two-thirds and adopted a 
resolution that the public interest and necessity demanded the 
acquisition, construction and of certain municipal 
improvements and for a municipal bond election. 
At a subsequent meeting an ordinance was adopted which 
called for a special election in the of Walnut Creek to 
submit to the electors of the a proposition for incurring 
a bonded indebtedness to cover the cost of said improvements. 
Notice was duly given. At a subsequent meeting, one section 
of the ordinance was amended and notice duly given thereof. 
The election was duly and regularly called and held in the 
manner provided by law; two-thirds of the votes cast at the 
election were in favor of, and authorized the issuance of the 
limited obligation bonds.8 
The Limited Obligation Bond Law of 1955 defines limited 
obligation bonds as bonds which are to be paid solely from 
sales and use taxes imposed and to be imposed and collected 
by the city ( § 43650). The law also provides that the bonds 
shall state that they are to be paid only from such revenues 
(§§ 43651, 43654); that the term of the bonds shall not exceed 
31 years and that "'rhe outstanding bonds shall not at any one 
time exceed an amount for which the average installments of 
principal and interest will exceed 66% per cent of tl1e net 
revenues to be derived from the imposition of sales taxes at 
the rate establishrd at the time of calling the election at which 
the proposition of authorizing their issuance is submitted, as 
2 The iindings of the legislrrtive body as to such popubtion, made after 
notice and public hearing, shall be conclusiYc. 
"There is no contention that the city failed to comply with any pro-




( 48654.1.) rrhe general 
is not liable for the pay-
ment the bonds or interest thereon; the revenues de-
rived from tax are liable therefor ( § 43663). 
The bonds on at such a price 
that installments of and interest 
bond issue of will not exceed 
per cent of the net reYennes be derived from sales taxes 




which was the rate established 
of the ordinance calling the election 
of the bonds ·was authorized. The re-
refused to issue the bonds and this 
'l'his was in accord with the statutory 
[2] Limited Obligation Boncl Law as a valid general law 
with respect to : It should be noted, preliminarily, 
that two principles population classification and 
legislation based thereon have been established in this state 
(see Rauer v. Williarns, 118 Cal. 401 [50 P. 691]; Ex parte 
Jackson, 143 Cal. 564, 569, 570 [77 P. 457]): (1) That there 
must be a reasonable basis for such elassification with respect 
to the subject matter of the legislation; and (2) that the legis-
lation must relate to a municipal affair. 
[3] (1) Reasonable basis ntle: In Darcy v. Mayor etc. 
of San Jose, 104 Cal. 642, 645, 646 P. 500], it was said 
that ''Legislatures and eourts are not at liberty to disregard 
a poliey so plainly manifested in the fundamental law. But, 
while the sovereign will is thus plainly in the funda-
mental law, the rule must not reeeive an interpretation too 
absolute. It will not be presumed that it was intended to 
deprive the legislature of all power to adapt its laws to the 
varying conditions of its inhabitants. From necessity it has 
been held that the legislature may classify in order that it 
may adapt its legislation to the needs of the people. If this 
eannot be done laws will not always bear equally upon the 
people. This elassification, however, must be founded upon 
differenees which are either defined by the constitution or 
natural, and which will suggest a reason which might ration-
ally be held to justify the diversity in the legislation. [ 4] It 
must not be arbitrary, for the mere purpose of classification, 
that legislation really local or special may seem to be general, 
'Government Code, scetion 43654.1. 
are: 
0.2d 
area. For residents and tax-
the burden of financing such improve-
be The only type of 
is available from residents living 
and use tax within the city since 
upon both residents and non-
the city, and not denied by the re-
of 1954 there were 115 cities of under 4,000 
in the state although there are no available figures 
all of these could meet the second population 
the Limited Obligation Bond Law. It is 
and not denied by respondent, that the 
of municipalities today is the improve-
of municipal facilities in order to keep 
needs precipitated by the growth within and 
boundaries. The Limited Obligation Bond Law 
''an urgency measure necessary for the im-
of the public peace, health or safety 
.uLcau.,u;.; of Article IV of the Constitution and shall 
The facts constituting such neces-
'There is an unprecedented population growth 
under way within the State and the cities therein. In many 
cities has caused the facilities within the com-
mercial area of a to be taxed beyond the general means 
of the or for which no general benefit exists beyond the 
commercial area therein. The proceeds of sales taxes are de-
rived the sale of merchandise within such commercial 
areas and constitute an appropriate means of revenue for re-
the eonditions within said commercial areas. 
''Other required by reason of said growth are 
of benefit. However, by reason of said un-
property taxes have seriously increased 
and it is that other sources of revenue be provided 
to pay the costs of needed improvements." (Stats. 1955, ch. 
1847, § 2, pp. 3429, 3430.) 
Feb. 
[6] We said in Drib in 
351, 352 (231 P.2d 
pertinent 
vested in the 
tional doubt erroneous. [ 
lation is not any 
conceived that would sustain it.' 
v. Pacific G. & E. Co. (1942), 20 
529] ; see also In ·re Herr em 
P.2d 345] ; Reclamation Distr·ict 
147, 156 [218 P. 762].) 
porting the legislative 
burden of overcoming the nw>onm 
cast upon the assailant.' 
(1947), supra, 30 CaL2d 719, 728 
410 [68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 IJ.Ed. 
Growers ( 19-13), 22 Cal.2d 507 
In re Fuller (1940), 15 Cal.2d 
California Phygicians' Service v. Oarr·ison 
790, 803 [172 P.2d 4, 167 A.ILR. . ) 
should be reasonable; i.e., 'have a 
legitimate object to be 
our concern whether the 
might think to be the wisest 
accomplishing its objects. 
(1945), 26 Cal.2d 224, 232, 234 
1109] .) " 
[5b] Applying the above principles to 
involved, we cannot hold, as a matter of 
fication here concerned has no reasonable 
may take judicial notice of the 
in the state; of the exodus of 
tion of cities into surrounding 
of the problems confronting small 
cilities for caring for such an increase(l 
[12] (2) Jfunicipal rule: " 
those words are used in the 
business affairs of a municipality. 






I of this 
sewers, light and power 
pal uses, wharves, 
fire apparatus, street 
!47 C.2(1 
structures necessary or convenient to carry 
purposes, and powers of the '' 
[13] 'l'he to made in the ins1ant ease 
consist of covering "\Valnut Creek which traverses the business 
area so that it may be used; to to extend 
non-through to wid<'n other in order to pro-
vide adequately for the incnased traffic circulation 
in the commercial area. There can be no question that the 
proposed improvements fall within the definition of municipal 
affairs as that rule is set forth in the decided eases (see 
Byrne v. Dra;in, 127 CaL 663 P. 433]; Ahlman v. Barber 
Asphalt Pav. Co., 40 Cal.App. 395 fl81 P. 238] ; City of 
San Jose v. Lynch, 4 Cal.2cl 760 [52 P.2cl 919]; Loop Lbr. Co. 
v. Van Loben 173 CaL 228 P. 600]). It has been 
held that the term "street work" ine1udes the bui1<1ing and 
construction of highways, and boulevards (City of 
San Diego v. Potter,] 53 Cal. 288 P. 1461 ; City of Crescent 
City v. Moran, 25 Cal.App.2d 133 P.2d 281] ; Gov. Code, 
§ 43601). 
[14] We are of the 
Bond Law fulfills the seeoml 
relate to a municipal affair. 
IJimited Obligation 
that the lrgis1ation 
[15] Permissible Extent of Indebic(lness: Respondent 
raises a question as to whether seetion 43605 of the Govern-
ment Code is app1icable here. 'l'hat section proviclrs: "Jlfa:ri-
mtLm indebtedness: 'Jnclebtedncss.' A shall not incur 
an indebtedness for public \Vhich exceeds in 
the aggregate 15 of the assessed value of all real and 
personal property of the ·within the of this 
section 'indebtedness' means bonded indebtedness of the city 
payable from the peoceeds of taxes levied upon taxable prop-
erty in the city." Statf;;. 19fi5, ch. :J:14. § 1.1 'l'h(' 




violated by revenue bonds 
which are payable from a special 
tl;e is not liable to main-
tnnd out of its general fnnds, or by tax 
the fnw1 prove insufficient. (Depart-
218 CaL 206, 216 ct seq. 
Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 
P.2d 425] ; In 're California Toll 
Cal. et seq. i 288 P. 485] 
many cases from other jurisdidions] ; Shelton 
Los 206 CaL 548 ct seq. [275 P. 421]; 
see Garrett v. 216 Cal. 220, 227 ct seq. [13 P.2d 
725]; 88 Am.Jur. 150 et seq.) [17] As pointed out in the 
case of In re Califor11ia To!l Bridge A1lthority, supm, 212 
Cal. at page such an obligation is not considered to be 
an indebtedness or liability of the political subdivision or 
agency issuing the within the meaning of the con-
stitutional limitation.'' And on page 737 it was concluded 
that "an obligmion whieh is payable out of a speeial fund 
is not an 'indebt edHess or liability' of a governmental body 
within the meaning of section 18 of article XI of the Con-
stitntion if the governmental body is not required to pay 
the obligation from its general funds, or by exercise of its 
powers of taxation, should the special fund prove insuffi-
cient." (See also A nthority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal.2d 
437 P.:2ll of I,a Jlcsa v. 137 CaL 
App.2d Rn f291 P.2d ; Board of Harbor Comt·s. v. Dean, 
118 Cal li28 [258 P.2d 590].) 
In Bank. Feb. 1, 1957.] 




Law-Probation-WithdrawaL-Probation is an act 
and be withdrawn if the privilege is abused. 
Id.-Probation-1\'Iodification.-An abuse of the privilege of 
is shown where defendant practices a deception on 
the court at the time probation is granted or violates any 
terms conditions of probation (Pen. Code, § 1203.2), in which 
case court is specifically authorized to modify and change 
any and all terms and conditions of probation. (Pen. Code, 
§ 
Id.-Probation-Modification.-While the court has a wide 
or modifying the terms of probation, 
or capriciously. 
Appealable-Order Granting Proba-
tion.-An order probation is appealable under Pen. 
subd. 1, as amended in 1951. 
!d.-Probation-Revocation-New Probation.-The court has 
1tuL:>ucwt.w,,, on revocation of probation, to place defendant on 
with new conditions. 
!d.-Appeal - Decisions Appealable - Order Modifying Pro-
bation.-Should the court arbitrarily modify a probationary 
order without judgment and sentence, an appeal will 
therefrom under Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. 3, as an appeal 
from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial 
of the probationer. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 363 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 994; [3, 5, 9, 10] 
Criminal Law,§ 997; [4, 6] Criminal Law, § 1053(5); [7] Habeas 
Corpus, § 12; [8] Habeas Corpus, § 7. 
